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Currency hedging for multinationals under
liquidity constraints
Rujing Meng, Kit Pong Wong ∗
School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of liquidity risk on the behavior of a risk-averse multi-
national firm (MNF) under exchange rate uncertainty in a two-period dynamic setting. The
MNF has operations domiciled in the home country and in a foreign country, each of which
produces a single homogeneous good to be sold in the home and foreign markets. To hedge
the exchange rate risk, the MNF has access to one-period currency futures and option con-
tracts in each period. The MNF is liquidity constrained in that it is obliged to terminate its
risk management program in the second period whenever the net loss due to its first-period
hedge position exceeds a predetermined threshold level. We show that the MNF optimally
sells less (more) and produces more (less) in the foreign (home) country in response to the
imposition of the liquidity constraint. We show further that the liquidity constrained MNF
optimally uses the currency option contracts in the first period for hedging purposes in
general, and opts for a long option position if its utility function is quadratic in particular.
JEL classification: D81; F23; F31
Keywords: Currency hedging; Liquidity constraints; Multinationals
1. Introduction
Multinational firms (MNFs) should take liquidity risk seriously when devising
their risk management strategies.1 Failing to comply may oblige even firms that are
technically solvent to go bankrupt. A prominent example that vividly illustrates
∗Corresponding author. Tel.: +852 2859 1044; fax: +852 2548 1152.
E-mail address: kpwong@econ.hku.hk (K.P. Wong).
1According to the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (1998), liquidity risk is one
of the risks that users of derivatives and other financial contracts must take into account.
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such a detrimental consequence of liquidity risk is the case of Metallgesellschaft A.
G. (MG), the fourteenth largest industrial firm in Germany.
In 1993, MG’s U.S. subsidiary, MG Refining and Marketing, Inc. (MGRM), offered
its customers fixed prices on oil and refined oil products up to 10 years into the future
as a marketing device. To hedge its exposure to oil prices, MGRM took on large
positions in energy derivatives, primarily in oil futures. When oil prices plummeted
in that year, MGRM was unable to meet its variation margin payments due to the
denial of credit from four major European banks .2 MGRM’s liquidity problems
resulted in a $2.4 billion rescue package coupled with a premature liquidation of its
hedge positions en masse so as to keep MG from going bankrupt (Culp and Miller,
1995).
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of liquidity risk on the behavior
of MNFs facing exchange rate uncertainty in general, and on the hedging role of
currency options in particular. To this end, we develop a two-period model of a
risk-averse MNF that has operations domiciled in the home country and in a foreign
country. Each of these two operations produces a single homogeneous good to be sold
in the home and foreign markets. The MNF has access to one-period currency futures
and option contracts in each period for hedging purposes. We impose a liquidity
constraint on the MNF in that the MNF is forced to terminate its risk management
program in the second period whenever the net loss due to its first-period hedge
position exceeds a predetermined threshold level. The liquidity constraint as such
truncates the MNF’s payoff profile. This truncation plays a pivotal role in shaping
the MNF’s optimal production and hedging decisions.
2Culp and Hanke (1994) report that “four major European banks called in their outstanding
loans to MGRM when its problems became public in December 1993. Those loans, which the banks
had previously rolled over each month, denied MGRM much needed cash to finance its variation
margin payments and exacerbated its liquidity problems.”
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When the liquidity constraint is absent, the well-known separation and full-hedging
theorems in the literature on MNFs under exchange rate uncertainty apply (see, e.g.,
Adam-Mu¨ller, 1997; Broll and Zilcha, 1992; Katz and Paroush, 1979; Kawai and
Zilcha, 1986; Wong, 2003a, 2003b, 2006). The separation theorem states that the
MNF’s production decision depends neither on its risk attitude nor on the underlying
exchange rate uncertainty. The full-hedging theorem states that the MNF should
completely eliminate its exchange rate risk exposure by adopting a full-hedge via the
unbiased currency futures contracts only. A corollary of the full-hedging theorem is
that the liquidity unconstrained MNF does not use the currency option contracts for
hedging purposes, thereby ruling out any hedging role of options.
In the presence of the liquidity constraint, the MNF is obliged to terminate its
risk management program in the second period should the net loss due to its first-
period hedge position exceed the predetermined threshold level. The MNF’s sales
in the foreign market as such are embedded with residual exchange rate risk that
cannot be hedged via the unbiased currency futures and option contracts. We show
that the MNF demands a positive risk premium on its foreign sales. This creates a
wedge between the marginal revenues in the home and foreign markets. In response
to the imposition of the liquidity constraint, the MNF optimally sells less (more) and
produces more (less) in the foreign (home) country, in accord with the findings of
Broll and Zilcha (1992) and Lien and Wong (2005). These adjustments in sales and
outputs result in a lower expected global domestic currency profit accrued to and
a lower expected utility level attainable by the MNF, as compared to those in the
absence of the liquidity constraint.
We show further that the liquidity constrained MNF optimally uses the currency
option contracts in the first period for hedging purposes in general, and opts for a long
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option position if its utility function is quadratic in particular. Since the liquidity
constraint truncates the MNF’s payoff profile, the MNF finds the long option position
particularly suitable for its hedging need. Moreover, we show that the MNF under-
hedges its exchange rate risk exposure so as to strike a balance between the extent
of the exchange rate risk and that of the liquidity risk. These findings are consistent
with the prevalent use of options (Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston, 1998) and the normal
practice of partial hedging (Tufano, 1996; Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston, 1998) by
non-financial firms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates a two-period
model of a risk-averse MNF facing both exchange rate uncertainty and liquidity risk.
The MNF has access to one-period currency futures and option contracts in each pe-
riod for hedging purposes. Section 3 characterizes the solution to the model. Section
4 examines the effect of the liquidity constraint on the MNF’s optimal production
and sales decisions. Section 5 derives the MNF’s optimal hedge position in the first
period and establishes the hedging role of currency options. Section 6 offers a numer-
ical example to quantify the impact of the liquidity constraint on the behavior of the
MNF. The final section concludes.
2. The model
Consider a two-period, three-date (indexed by t = 0, 1, and 2) model of a multi-
national firm (MNF) that has operations domiciled in the home country and in a
foreign country. At t = 0, interest rates in both periods are known with certainty.
To simplify notation, we henceforth suppress the interest factors by compounding all
cash flows to their future values at t = 2.
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The MNF’s home operation produces a single homogeneous good, x, according
to a cost function, cx(x), denominated in the domestic currency. We assume that
cx(0) ≥ 0, c′x(x) > 0, and c′′x(x) > 0 to reflect the fact that the MNF’s production
technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale. At t = 2, the MNF sells xh and xf
units of the good, x, in the home and foreign countries, respectively. The sales in
the home market generate a revenue function, rx(xh), denominated in the domestic
currency, whereas the sales in the foreign market generate a revenue function, Rx(xf),
denominated in the foreign currency. We assume that rx(xh) and Rx(xf) are strictly
increasing and concave to capture the idea that the MNF is likely to enjoy some
monopoly power in the home and foreign markets.
The MNF’s foreign operation produces another single homogeneous good, y, ac-
cording to a cost function, cy(y), denominated in the foreign currency, where cy(0) ≥
0, c′y(y) > 0, and c
′′
y(y) > 0. We assume that the two homogeneous goods, x and y,
are independent of each other.3 At t = 2, the MNF sells yh and yf units of the good,
y, in the home and foreign countries, respectively. The sales in the home market
generate a revenue function, ry(yh), denominated in the domestic currency, whereas
the sales in the foreign market generate a revenue function, Ry(yf), denominated in
the foreign currency. The revenue functions, ry(yh) and Ry(yf), are strictly increasing
and concave.
The spot exchange rate at date t (t = 1 and 2), denoted by e˜t and expressed in
units of the domestic currency against the foreign currency, is not known at t = 0.4
We assume that the spot exchange rates follow a random walk so that e˜t = et−1+ ε˜t,
3In an earlier version of this paper, we have considered an alternative case that the MNF’s home
and foreign operations produce the same homogeneous good. None of the qualitative results are
affected except that we would have one-way trade between the home and foreign operations rather
than two-way trade as in the current model.
4Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
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where ε˜1 and ε˜2 are two zero-mean random variables independent of each other. To
hedge the exchange rate risk, the MNF can trade one-period currency futures and
call option contracts at the beginning of each period.5 The MNF is a price taker in
the currency futures and options markets.
At t = 0, the MNF sells (purchases if negative) h0 units of the first-period currency
futures contracts at the predetermined futures exchange rate, f0. At the same time,
the MNF writes (buys if negative) z0 units of the first-period currency call options
with the strike price, s0, and at the predetermined option premium, p0. Conditional
on the realized value of the spot exchange rate at t = 1, the MNF enjoys a net gain
(or suffers a net loss if negative) of (f0− e1)h0−max(e1− s0, 0)z0 from its first-period
hedge position, (h0, z0). As in Wong (2004) and Lien and Wong (2005), the MNF is
liquidity constrained in that it is obliged to terminate its risk management program
whenever the net loss incurred at t = 1 exceeds a prespecified threshold level, k. That
is, if (e1 − f0)h0 + max(e1 − s0, 0)z0 > k, the MNF’s random global profit at t = 2,
denominated in the domestic currency, is given by
p˜i` = rx(xh) + ry(yh)− cx(xh + xf) + (e1 + ε˜2)[Rx(xf ) +Ry(yf)− cy(yh + yf)]
+(f0 − e1)h0 + [p0 −max(e1 − s0, 0)]z0, (1)
since e˜2 = e1 + ε˜2.
At t = 1, if the net loss from its first-period hedge position, (h0, z0), is below the
prespecified threshold level, k, the MNF continues its risk management program in
the second period. In this case, the MNF sells (purchases if negative) h1 units of the
5We do not consider currency put option contracts because they are redundant in that they
can be readily replicated by combinations of currency futures and call option contracts (Sercu and
Uppal, 1995).
R. Meng, K.P. Wong / J. of Multi. Fin. Manag. 7
second-period currency futures contracts at the then prevailing futures exchange rate,
f1, and writes (buys if negative) z1 units of the second-period currency call options
with the strike price, s1, and at the then prevailing option premium, p1. The MNF
expects the second-period currency futures and call option contracts to be unbiased
in that f1 = e1 and p1 is set equal to the expected value of max(e1+ ε˜2− s1, 0). Thus,
if (e1 − f0)h0 + max(e1 − s0, 0)z0 ≤ k, the MNF’s random global domestic currency
profit at t = 2 is given by
p˜ic = p˜i` + (f1 − e1 − ε˜2)h1 + [p1 −max(e1 + ε˜2 − s1, 0)]z1, (2)
where p˜i` is defined in Eq. (1).
The MNF possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, u(pi), defined
over its global domestic currency profit at t = 2, pi, with u′(pi) > 0 and u′′(pi) < 0,
indicating the presence of risk aversion.6 The MNF’s multi-period decision problem
can be described in the following recursive manner. At t = 1, if the net loss from its
first-period hedge position, (h0, z0), does not exceed the threshold level, k, the MNF
is allowed to choose its second-period hedge position, (h1, z1), so as to maximize the
expected utility of its random global domestic currency profit at t = 2, which is
given by Eq. (2). At t = 0, anticipating the liquidity constraint at t = 1 and its
second-period optimal hedge position, (h∗1, z
∗
1), the MNF chooses the levels of sales in
the home and foreign markets, xh, yh, xf , and yf , and selects the first-period hedge
position, (h0, z0), so as to maximize the expected utility of its random global domestic
currency profit at t = 2, which is given by Eqs. (1) and (2).
6If the MNF is risk neutral, currency hedging adds no value to the MNF. The assumption of risk
aversion can be justified by the prevalence of corporate taxes, costs of financial distress, or capital
market imperfections (see Stulz, 1996).
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3. Solution to the model
As usual, the MNF’s multi-period decision problem is solved by using backward
induction. At t = 1, if (e1 − f0)h0 + max(e1 − s0, 0)z0 > k, the MNF is obliged to
terminate its risk management program and thereby no further hedging decisions can
be made. On the other hand, if (e1 − f0)h0 + max(e1 − s0, 0)z0 ≤ k, the MNF is
allowed to choose its second-period hedge position, (h1, z1), so as to maximize the
expected utility of its random global domestic currency profit at t = 2:
max
h1,z1
E2[u(p˜ic)], (3)
where E2(·) is the expectation operator with respect to the cumulative distribution
function of ε˜2, and p˜ic is defined in Eq. (2). The first-order conditions for program
(3) are given by7
E2[u
′(p˜i∗c )(f1 − e1 − ε˜2)] = 0, (4)
and
E2{u′(p˜i∗c )[p1 −max(e1 + ε˜2 − s1, 0)]} = 0, (5)
where an asterisk (∗) indicates an optimal level.
If h1 = Rx(xf )+Ry(yf )− cy(yh + yf ) and z1 = 0, Eq. (2) implies that the MNF’s
global domestic currency profit at t = 2 becomes
rx(xh) + ry(yh)− ch(xh + xf ) + f1[Rx(xf) +Ry(yf )− cy(yh + yf)]
+(f0 − e1)h0 + [p0 −max(e1 − s0, 0)]z0,
7The second-order conditions for program (3) are satisfied given risk aversion.
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which is non-stochastic. Since f1 = e1, E2(ε˜2) = 0, and p1 = E2[max(e1+ ε˜2− s1, 0)],
it follows that h∗1 = Rx(xf ) + Ry(yf ) − cy(yh + yf) and z∗1 = 0 indeed solve Eqs. (4)
and (5) simultaneously. When the MNF can continue its risk management program
in the second period, there are no more liquidity constraints. In this case, the full-
hedging theorem in the literature on MNFs under exchange rate uncertainty applies
(see, e.g., Adam-Mu¨ller, 1997; Broll and Zilcha, 1992; Katz and Paroush, 1979; Kawai
and Zilcha, 1986; Wong, 2003a, 2003b, 2006). As such, the MNF finds it optimal to
completely eliminate its exchange rate risk exposure by adopting a full-hedge via
the unbiased second-period currency futures contracts, i.e., h∗1 = Rx(xf) +Ry(yf )−
cy(yh + yf ). There is no hedging role to be played by the unbiased second-period
currency call option contracts, i.e., z∗1 = 0.
Note that e1 = e0 + ε1. If (e0 + ε1 − f0)h0 + max(e0 + ε1 − s0, 0)z0 ≤ k, i.e., if
ε1 ≤ (k + f0h0 + s0z0)/(h0 + z0) − e0, the MNF anticipates that its optimal second-
period hedge position is (h∗1, z
∗
1) as characterized above so that its random global
domestic currency profit at t = 2 is given by
pic(ε1) = rx(xh) + ry(yh)− cx(xh + xf) + (e0 + ε1)[Rx(xf) +Ry(yf )− cy(yh + yf )]
+(f0 − e0 − ε1)h0 + [p0 −max(e0 + ε1 − s0, 0)]z0. (6)
On the other hand, if (e0 + ε1 − f0)h0 + max(e0 + ε1 − s0, 0)z0 > k, i.e., if ε1 >
(k+f0h0+ s0z0)/(h0+ z0)− e0, the MNF is obliged to terminate its risk management
program in the second period so that its random global domestic currency profit at
t = 2 becomes
pi`(ε1, ε˜2) = pic(ε1) + ε˜2[Rx(xf ) +Ry(yf)− cy(yh + yf)], (7)
where pic(ε1) is defined in Eq. (6).
R. Meng, K.P. Wong / J. of Multi. Fin. Manag. 10
Now, we go back to t = 0. The MNF’s ex-ante decision problem is to choose
the levels of sales in the home and foreign operations, xh, xf , yh, and yf , and selects
the first-period hedge position, (h0, z0), so as to maximize the expected utility of its
random global domestic currency profit at t = 2:
max
xh,xf ,yh,yf ,h0,z0
∫ k+f0h0+s0z0
h0+z0
−e0
ε1
u[pic(ε1)] dF (ε1)
+
∫ ε1
k+f0h0+s0z0
h0+z0
−e0
E2{u[pi`(ε1, ε˜2)]} dF (ε1), (8)
where F (ε1) is the cumulative distribution function of ε˜1 over support [ε1, ε1], with
−∞ ≤ ε1 < 0 < ε1 ≤ ∞, and pic(ε1) and pi`(ε1, ε˜2) are defined in Eqs. (6) and (7),
respectively. The first-order conditions for program (8) are given in Appendix A.8
4. Optimal production and sales decisions
In this section, we examine the optimal production and sales decisions of the MNF
in the presence of the liquidity constraint. From the first-order conditions for program
(8), we can derive the following system of equations:9
r′x(x
∗
h) = c
′
x(x
∗
h + x
∗
f), (9)
(f0 − θ)R′x(x∗f) = c′x(x∗h + x∗f), (10)
r′y(y
∗
h) = (f0 − θ)c′y(y∗h + y∗f), (11)
and
R′y(y
∗
f) = c
′
y(y
∗
h + y
∗
f), (12)
8The second-order conditions for program (8) are satisfied given risk aversion and the assumed
properties of rx(xh), ry(yh), Rx(xf ), Ry(yf ), cx(x), and cy(y).
9See Appendix A for the derivation.
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where an asterisk (∗) indicates an optimal level, and θ > 0 is defined in Eq. (A.9) in
Appendix A.
As a benchmark, suppose that the MNF does not encounter the liquidity con-
straint. In this case, Eqs. (9) to (12) reduce to10
r′x(x
0
h) = c
′
x(x
0
h + x
0
f), (13)
f0R
′
x(x
0
f) = c
′
x(x
0
h + x
0
f), (14)
r′y(y
0
h) = f0c
′
y(y
0
h + y
0
f ), (15)
and
R′y(y
0
f) = c
′
y(y
0
h + y
0
f), (16)
where a nought (0) indicates an optimal level in this benchmark case. In the absence
of the liquidity constraint, the MNF’s random global domestic currency profit at t = 2
is given by Eq. (2) only. The MNF could have completely eliminated its exposure to
the exchange rate risk had it chosen h0 = Rx(xf) +Ry(yf )− cy(yh + yf ) and z0 = 0
within its own discretion. Alternatively put, the degree of exchange rate risk exposure
to be assumed by the MNF should be totally unrelated to its production and sales
decisions. The optimal levels of sales in the home and foreign markets are then chosen
to maximize rx(xh)+ ry(yh)− cx(xh+xf )+f0[Rx(xf)+Ry(yf)− cy(yh+yf)], thereby
yielding Eqs. (13) to (16). Eq. (13) states that the MNF equates the marginal cost
of the good produced in the home operation to the marginal revenue of the good in
the home market. Eqs. (13) and (14) imply that the marginal revenues of the good
10The benchmark case is tantamount to setting k = ∞. From Eq. (A.9) in Appendix A, it is
evident that θ = 0 when k =∞.
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produced in the home operation, denominated in the domestic currency, are equalized
in the home and foreign markets, where the exchange rate is locked in at the initial
futures exchange rate, f0. Likewise, Eqs. (15) and (16) imply similar optimality
conditions for the good produced in the foreign operation.11
Comparing the set of optimality conditions with the liquidity constraint, Eqs. (9)
to (12), to that without the liquidity constraint, Eqs. (13) to (16), yields the following
proposition.12
Proposition 1. If the risk-averse MNF has access to the currency futures and
options markets for hedging purposes in each period, then imposing the liquidity con-
straint on the MNF induces (i) greater sales of both goods in the home market, i.e.,
x∗h > x
0
h and y
∗
h > y
0
h, (ii) lower sales of both goods in the foreign market, i.e., x
∗
f < x
0
f
and y∗f < y
0
f , (iii) lower output in the home operation, i.e., x
∗
h + x
∗
f < x
0
h + x
0
f , and
(iv) higher output in the foreign operation, i.e., y∗h + y
∗
f > y
0
h + y
0
f .
To see the intuition of Proposition 1, we refer to Eqs. (6) and (7). In the presence
of the liquidity constraint, setting h0 = Rx(xf)+Ry(yf )−cy(yh+yf ) and z0 = 0 cannot
eliminate all the exchange rate risk due to the residual risk, ε˜2[Rx(xf ) + Ry(yf) −
cy(yh + yf)], arising from the termination of the risk management program at t = 1,
as is evident from Eq. (7). Such residual risk, however, can be controlled by varying
the levels of sales in the home and foreign markets. Eq. (9) states that it remains
optimal for the MNF to equate the marginal cost of the good produced in the home
operation to the marginal revenue of the good in the home market. Eqs. (9) and
11These results are analogous to the celebrated separation theorem in the literature on MNFs
under exchange rate uncertainty (see, e.g., Adam-Mu¨ller, 1997; Broll and Zilcha, 1992; Katz and
Paroush, 1979; Kawai and Zilcha, 1986; Wong, 2003a, 2003b, 2006).
12All proofs of propositions are given in Appendix A.
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(10), however, imply that the marginal revenue of the good produced in the home
operation is strictly smaller in the home market than in the foreign market, where the
latter is denominated in the domestic currency with the exchange rate locked in at the
initial futures exchange rate, f0. Since the sales in the foreign market are embedded
with some exchange rate risk that cannot be eliminated due to the presence of the
liquidity constraint, the MNF has to demand a risk premium to compensate for its
foreign sales. The wedge between the two marginal revenues in the home and foreign
markets is de facto the risk premium required by the MNF. Similar arguments apply
to the good produced in the foreign operation. The MNF as such sells less (more)
and produces more (less) in the foreign (home) country. These results are in line with
the findings of Broll and Zilcha (1992) and Lien and Wong (2005).13
5. Optimal hedging decisions
In this section, we examine the optimal hedging decisions of the MNF in the
presence of the liquidity constraint. We are particularly interested in scrutinizing
the hedging role of the first-period currency call options. To this end, we impose an
additional assumption that the first-period currency futures and call option contracts
are both unbiased in that f0 = e0 and p0 is set equal to the expected value of
max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0).14 We say that the first-period currency call options are in the
money, at the money, or out of the money if, and only if, s0 is less than, equal to, or
greater than e0, respectively.
13Lien and Wong (2005) derive similar results when the MNF is restricted to use unbiased two-
period currency futures contracts that are marked to market in each period. Since the hedging
environment is more incomplete in Lien and Wong (2005), risk aversion alone does not suffice to
yield the desired results and additional condition of prudence (Kimball, 1990, 1993) is called for.
14We introduce this unbiasedness assumption so as to focus on the MNF’s hedging motive (vis-a`-vis
its speculative motive). If there are many risk-neutral speculators populated in the currency futures
and option markets, the unbiasedness of the futures and option prices is an immediate consequence
of no arbitrage opportunities.
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In the benchmark case wherein the liquidity constraint is absent, it is evident that
the full-hedging theorem holds. Specifically, the MNF’s optimal first-period hedge
position, (h00, z
0
0), satisfies that h
0
0 = Rx(x
0
f) +Ry(y
0
f )− cy(y0h+ y0f ) and z00 = 0, which
completely eliminates the MNF’s exchange rate risk exposure. Thus, the liquidity
unconstrained MNF uses no currency options for hedging purposes.
In the presence of the liquidity constraint, the full-hedging theorem in general
does not hold. To see this, it suffices to restrict our attention to the case wherein the
MNF’s utility function, u(pi), takes on the following quadratic form:
u(pi) = u(0) + api − b
2
pi2, (17)
where a and b are positive constants such that u′(pi) = a − bpi > 0 for all relevant
values of pi. In this case, the first-order conditions for program (8) imply the following
system of equations:15
−Cov1[a− bpi∗c (ε˜1), ε˜1]− bψ1 = 0, (18)
and
−Cov1[a− bpi∗c (ε˜1),max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]− bψ2 = 0, (19)
where Cov1(·, ·) is the covariance operator with respect to F (ε1), ε∗1 = (k + e0h∗0 +
s0z
∗
0)/(h
∗
0 + z
∗
0)− e0,
ψ1 =
1
2
E2(ε˜
2
2)[Rx(x
∗
f ) +Ry(y
∗
f)− cy(y∗h + y∗f)]2F ′(ε∗1)
k + (s0 − e0)z∗0
(h∗0 + z∗0)2
> 0. (20)
15From Eqs. (6) and (7), we have pi∗c (ε1) = E2[pi∗` (ε1, ε˜2)] for all ε1 ∈ [ε1, ε1]. Since u(pi) is defined
in Eq. (17), we have u′[pi∗c (ε1)] = E2{u′[pi∗` (ε1, ε˜2)]} = a − bpi∗c (ε1) for all ε1 ∈ [ε1, ε1]. Thus, Eqs.
(A.5) and (A.6) in Appendix A reduce to Eqs. (18) and (19), respectively.
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and
ψ2 =
1
2
E2(ε˜
2
2)[Rx(x
∗
f ) +Ry(y
∗
f)− cy(y∗h + y∗f)]2F ′(ε∗1)
k + (e0 − s0)h∗0
(h∗0 + z
∗
0)
2
> 0. (21)
Using Eq. (6), we can write Eqs. (18) and (19) as
Var1(ε˜1)[Rx(x
∗
f) +Ry(y
∗
f)− cy(y∗h + y∗f )− h∗0]
−Cov1[ε˜1,max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]z∗0 = ψ1, (22)
and
Cov1[ε˜1,max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)][Rx(x∗f) +Ry(y∗f )− cy(y∗h + y∗f )− h∗0]
−Var1[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]z∗0 = ψ2, (23)
where Var1(·) is the variance operator with respect to F (ε1).
Multiplying Var1[max(e0+ ε˜1−e0, 0)] to Eq. (22) and Cov1[ε˜1,max(e0+ ε˜1−s0, 0)]
to Eq. (23), and subtracting the resulting two equations yields
h∗0 = Rx(x
∗
f ) +Ry(y
∗
f)− cy(y∗h + y∗f)
+
ψ2Cov1[ε˜1,max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]− ψ1Var1[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]
Var1(ε˜1)Var[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]− Cov1[ε˜1,max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]2 . (24)
Multiplying Cov1[ε˜1,max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)] to Eq. (22) and Var1(ε˜1) to Eq. (23), and
subtracting the resulting two equations yields
z∗0 =
ψ1Cov1[ε˜1,max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]− ψ2Var1(ε˜1)
Var1(ε˜1)Var[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]−Cov1[ε˜1,max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]2 . (25)
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It is evident from Eqs. (20) and (21) that ψ1 and ψ2 depend on h
∗
0 and z
∗
0. Thus,
Eqs. (24) and (25) do not give us a closed form solution to h∗0 and z
∗
0.
The following proposition characterizes the MNF’s first-period optimal hedge po-
sition, (h∗0, z
∗
0).
Proposition 2. Suppose that the liquidity constrained MNF has access to the un-
biased one-period currency futures and call option contracts for hedging purposes in
each period and has a quadratic utility function. If the first-period currency call
options are not too out of the money, then the MNF’s optimal first-period hedge
position, (h∗0, z
∗
0), satisfies that h
∗
0 > Rx(x
∗
f) + Ry(y
∗
f ) − cy(y∗h + y∗f ), z∗0 < 0, and
h∗0 + z
∗
0 < Rx(x
∗
f ) +Ry(y
∗
f )− cy(y∗h + y∗f).
The intuition of Proposition 2 is as follows. If the MNF opts for the first-period
hedge position with h0 = Rx(xf ) + Ry(yf) − cy(yh + yf ) and z0 = 0, the MNF faces
no exchange rate risk only when its risk management program is continued at t = 1,
which occurs over the interval, [ε1, k/h0]. If the currency call option contracts are
not too out of the money (i.e., s0 is not sufficiently greater than e0), the MNF finds
it optimal to opt for z0 < 0 in order to further improve the hedging performance.
Doing so enlarges the interval from [ε1, k/h0] to [ε1, (k + s0z0 − e0z0)/(h0 + z0)]. In
this case, we have h0 + z0 < Rx(xf) +Ry(yf )− cy(yh + yf ) so that the MNF’s global
domestic currency profit is low when the realizations of ε˜1 are small. Being risk averse,
the MNF cares more about the states in which its realized global domestic currency
profit is low than those states in which its realized global domestic currency profit is
high. The risk-averse MNF thus increases its first-period futures position such that
h0 > Rx(xf )+Ry(yf)− cy(yh+ yf) but h0+ z0 < Rx(xf)+Ry(yf )− cy(yh+ yf). This
hedge position shifts the MNF’s global domestic currency profit from the high states
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to the low states, thereby achieving the best hedging performance in the presence of
the liquidity constraint.
In the 1998 Wharton survey of financial risk management by US non-financial
firms, Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston (1998) report that 68% of the 200 derivatives-
using firms indicated that they had used some form of options within the past 12
months. Also, they find that most companies in the survey do not completely hedge
their risk exposures. Tufano (1996) documents that in the gold mining industry only
17% of firms shed 40% or more of their price risk. These empirical findings are
consistent with the results in Proposition 2. The prevalence of liquidity constraints
faced by MNFs is likely to account for the hedging role of currency options and the
optimality of under-hedging by these firms.
6. A numerical example
In this section, we construct a numerical example to quantify the impact of the
liquidity constraint on the behavior of the MNF. To this end, suppose that the MNF
has the utility function: u(pi) = 10pi − 0.2pi2, the cost functions: cx(x) = 0.5x2
and cy(y) = 0.5y
2, and the revenue functions: rx(xh) = 10
√
xh, ry(yh) = 10
√
yh,
Rx(xf) = 10
√
xf , and Ry(yf) = 10
√
yf . Assume that ε˜1 and ε˜2 are two standard
normal variates. Furthermore, assume that the one-period currency futures and call
option contracts are unbiased in each period. We set s0 = e0 = 1 and k = 5.
In the absence of the liquidity constraint, we have x0h = x
0
f = y
0
h = y
0
f = 1.84.
In the presence of the liquidity constraint, we have x∗h = 2.24, x
∗
f = 1.10, y
∗
h = 2.84,
and y∗f = 1.39, so that the output in the home operation drops by 9.24% while that
in the foreign operation rises by 14.95%. The MNF’s first-period hedge position is
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h∗0 = 18.49 and z
∗
0 = −16.24, which covers 16.89% of the exchange rate risk exposure.
Such deviations in the optimal production and hedging decisions result in a reduction
in the expected global domestic currency profit from 40.72 to 39.57 (a drop by 2.82%),
and a reduction in the expected utility from 241.38 to 235.83 (a drop by 2.30%). Thus,
it is indeed important for the MNF to take the liquidity constraint into considerations
when it forms its hedging strategy.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the impact of liquidity risk on the behavior of a
risk-averse multinational firm (MNF) under exchange rate uncertainty in a two-period
dynamic setting. The MNF has operations domiciled in the home country and in a
foreign country, each of which produces a single homogeneous good to be sold in the
home and foreign markets. To hedge the exchange rate risk, the MNF has access to
one-period currency futures and option contracts in each period. We have introduced
liquidity risk to the MNF by imposing a liquidity constraint that obliges the MNF to
terminate its risk management program in the second period whenever the net loss
due to its first-period hedge position exceeds a predetermined threshold level.
The liquidity constrained MNF is shown to demand a positive risk premium on its
foreign sales, which creates a wedge between the marginal revenues in the home and
foreign markets. In response to the imposition of the liquidity constraint, the MNF
optimally sells less (more) and produces more (less) in the foreign (home) country.
The liquidity constrained MNF as such receives a lower expected global domestic
currency profit and attains a lower expected utility level than in the case when the
liquidity constrained is absent. These results are in line with those of Broll and Zilcha
(1992) and Lien and Wong (2005).
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When the liquidity constrained MNF has a quadratic utility function, we have
shown that the MNF opts for a long currency option position in the first period. Fur-
thermore, we have shown that the MNF under-hedges its exchange rate risk exposure
so as to strike a balance between the extent of the exchange rate risk and that of
the liquidity risk. These results are consistent with the empirical findings that non-
financial firms use options quite often (Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston, 1998) and tend
to partially hedge their risk exposures (Tufano, 1996; Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston,
1998). The prevalence of liquidity constraints faced by MNFs thus offers a rationale
to the hedging role of currency options and the optimality of under-hedging by these
firms.
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Appendix A
First-order conditions for program (8). Using Leibniz’s rule, the first-order
conditions for program (8) with respect to xh, xf , yh, yf , h0, and z0 are respectively
given by
∫ ε∗1
ε1
u′[pi∗c(ε1)][r
′
x(x
∗
h)− c′x(x∗h + x∗f)] dF (ε1)
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+
∫ ε1
ε∗1
E2{u′[pi∗` (ε1, ε˜2)]}[r′x(x∗h) − c′x(x∗h + x∗f )] dF (ε1) = 0, (A.1)
∫ ε∗1
ε1
u′[pi∗c(ε1)][(e0+ ε1)R
′
x(x
∗
f)− c′x(x∗h + x∗f)] dF (ε1)
+
∫ ε1
ε∗1
E2{u′[pi∗` (ε1, ε˜2)][(e0 + ε1 + ε˜2)R′x(x∗f) − c′x(x∗h + x∗f )]} dF (ε1) = 0, (A.2)
∫ ε∗1
ε1
u′[pi∗c(ε1)][r
′
y(y
∗
h)− (e0 + ε1)c′y(y∗h + y∗f )] dF (ε1)
+
∫ ε1
ε∗1
E2{u′[pi∗` (ε1, ε˜2)][r′y(y∗h)− (e0 + ε1 + ε˜2)c′y(y∗h + y∗f)]} dF (ε1) = 0, (A.3)
∫ ε∗1
ε1
u′[pi∗c(ε1)](e0 + ε1)[R
′
y(y
∗
f)− c′y(y∗h + y∗f)] dF (ε1)
+
∫ ε1
ε∗1
E2{u′[pi∗` (ε1, ε˜2)](e0 + ε1 + ε˜2)}[R′y(y∗f)− c′y(y∗h + y∗f)] dF (ε1) = 0, (A.4)
∫ ε∗1
ε1
u′[pi∗c(ε1)](f0 − e0 − ε1) dF (ε1)
+
∫ ε1
ε∗1
E2{u′[pi∗` (ε1, ε˜2)]}(f0 − e0 − ε1) dF (ε1)− φ1 = 0, (A.5)
and
∫ ε∗1
ε1
u′[pi∗c(ε1)][p0 −max(e0 + ε1 − s0, 0)] dF (ε1)
+
∫ ε1
ε∗1
E2{u′[pi∗` (ε1, ε˜2)]}[p0 −max(e0 + ε1 − s0, 0)] dF (ε1)− φ2 = 0, (A.6)
where an asterisk (∗) indicates an optimal level, ε∗1 = (k+ f0h
∗
0+ s0z
∗
0)/(h
∗
0+ z
∗
0)− e0,
φ1 =
{
u[pi∗c (ε
∗
1)]− E{u[pi∗` (ε∗1, ε˜2)]}
}
F ′(ε∗1)
k + (s0 − f0)z∗0
(h∗0 + z∗0)2
, (A.7)
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and
φ2 =
{
u[pi∗c (ε
∗
1)]− E{u[pi∗` (ε∗1, ε˜2)]}
}
F ′(ε∗1)
k + (f0 − s0)h∗0
(h∗0 + z∗0)2
. (A.8)
Using Eqs. (6) and (7) and the fact that ε˜2 has a mean of zero yields pi
∗
c (ε
∗
1) =
E[pi∗` (ε
∗
1, ε˜2)]. It then follows from Jensen’s inequality and risk aversion that the right-
hand of Eq. (A.7) is positive so that φ1 > 0.
Since u′(pi) > 0, Eqs. (A.1) and (A.4) reduce to Eqs. (9) and (12), respectively.
Multiplying R′x(x
∗
f) to Eq. (A.5) and adding the resulting equation to Eq. (A.2)
yields Eq. (10), where
θ =
φ1 − ∫ ε1ε∗1 E2{u′[pi∗` (ε1, ε˜2)]ε˜2} dF (ε1)∫ ε∗1
ε1
u′[pi∗c (ε1)] dF (ε1) +
∫ ε1
ε∗1
E2{u′[pi∗` (ε1, ε˜2)]} dF (ε1)
. (A.9)
Multiplying c′y(y
∗
h+ y
∗
f ) to Eq. (A.5) and subtracting the resulting equation from Eq.
(A.3) yields Eq. (11), where θ is given by Eq. (A.9). Note that E{u′[pi∗` (ε1, ε˜2)]ε˜2} =
Cov{u′[pi∗` (ε1, ε˜2)], ε˜2}, where Cov(·, ·) is the covariance operator with respect to
the cumulative distribution function of ε˜2. Note also that ∂u
′[pi∗` (ε1, ε2)]/∂ε2 =
u′′[pi∗` (ε1, ε2)][Rx(x
∗
f)+Ry(y
∗
f)−cy(y∗h+y∗f)] < 0. Thus, we have Cov{u′[pi∗` (ε1, ε˜2)], ε˜2} <
0. Eqs. (A.7) and (A.9) then imply that θ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose first that x∗h ≤ x0h. Since r′′x(xh) < 0, we have
r′x(x
∗
h) ≥ r′x(x0h). Eqs. (9) and (13) then imply that c′x(x∗h + x∗f) ≥ c′x(x0h + x0f ). Since
c′′x(x) > 0 and x
∗
h ≤ x0h, we must have x∗f ≥ x0f . It then follows from R′′x(xf ) < 0 and
θ > 0 that (f0 − θ)R′x(x∗f ) < f0R′x(x0f). But this inequality together with Eqs. (10)
and (14) would imply that c′x(x
∗
h + x
∗
f) < c
′
x(x
0
h + x
0
f ), a contradiction. Hence, the
supposition is not true and we must have x∗h > x
0
h. It then follows from r
′′
x(xh) < 0
that r′x(x
∗
h) < r
′
x(x
0
h). Eqs. (9) and (13) thus imply that c
′
x(x
∗
h + x
∗
f ) < c
′
x(x
0
h + x
0
f).
Since c′′x(x) > 0, we must have x
∗
h + x
∗
f < x
0
h + x
0
f and thereby x
∗
f < x
0
f .
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Now, suppose that y∗f ≥ y0f . Since R′′y(yf ) < 0, we have R′y(y∗f ) ≤ R′y(y0f ). Eqs.
(12) and (16) then imply that c′y(y
∗
h + y
∗
f ) ≤ c′y(y0h + y0f ). Since c′′y(y) > 0 and
y∗f ≥ y0f , we must have y∗h ≤ y0h. It then follows from r′′y (yh) < 0 that r′y(y∗h) ≥ r′y(y0h).
But this inequality together with Eqs. (10) and (14) and θ > 0 would imply that
c′y(y
∗
h + y
∗
f ) > c
′
y(y
0
h + y
0
f ), a contradiction. Hence, the supposition is not true and we
must have y∗f < y
0
f . It then follows from R
′′
y(yf ) < 0 that R
′
y(y
∗
f) > R
′
y(y
0
f). Eqs. (12)
and (16) thus imply that c′y(y
∗
h + y
∗
f) > c
′
y(y
0
h + y
0
f). Since c
′′
y(y) > 0, we must have
y∗h + y
∗
f > y
0
h + y
0
f and thereby y
∗
h > y
0
h.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the following:
E1
{
{ε˜1 + v[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)− p0]}2
}
= Var1(ε˜1)+2vCov1[ε˜1,max(e0+ ε˜1−s0, 0)]+v2Var1[max(e0+ ε˜1−s0, 0)],(A.10)
which is positive for all real values of v. Set
v = −Cov1[ε˜1,max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]
Var1[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)] . (A.11)
Substituting Eq. (A.11) into the right-hand side of Eq. (A.10) yields
Var1(ε˜1)− Cov1[ε˜1,max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]
2
Var1[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)] > 0. (A.12)
Hence, the denominators on the right-hand sides of Eqs. (24) and (25) are positive.
Since e0 + ε˜1 − s0 = max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)−max(s0 − e0 − ε˜1, 0), we have
Cov1[ε˜1,max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]−Var1[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]
= −Cov1[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0),max(s0 − e0 − ε˜1, 0)]
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= −E1[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)max(s0 − e0 − ε˜1, 0)]
+E1[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]E1[max(s0 − e0 − ε˜1, 0)]
= E1[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]E1[max(s0 − e0 − ε˜1, 0)] > 0. (A.13)
Subtracting Eq. (20) from Eq. (21) yields
ψ2 − ψ1 = 1
2
E2(ε˜
2
2)[Rx(x
∗
f) +Ry(y
∗
f)− cy(y∗h + y∗f )]2F ′(ε∗1)
e0 − s0
h∗0 + z∗0
. (A.14)
The numerator on the right-hand side of Eq. (24) can be written as
ψ2{Cov1[ε˜1,max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]−Var1[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]}
+(ψ2 − ψ1)Var1[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)],
which is strictly positive if s0 ≤ e0, as is evident from Eqs. (A.13) and (A.14). By
continuity, it then follows form Eq. (24) that h∗0 > Rx(x
∗
f) + Ry(y
∗
f ) − cy(y∗h + y∗f) if
the first-period currency call options are not too out of the money.
Since e0 + ε˜1 − s0 = max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)−max(s0 − e0 − ε˜1, 0), we have
Var1(ε˜1)− Cov1[ε˜1,max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]
= −Cov1[ε˜1,max(s0 − e0 − ε˜1, 0)] > 0. (A.15)
The numerator on the right-hand side of Eq. (25) can be written as
ψ1{Cov1[ε˜1,max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]−Var1(ε˜1)} − (ψ2 − ψ1)Var1(ε˜1),
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which is strictly negative if s0 ≤ e0, as is evident from Eqs. (A.15) and (A.14). By
continuity, it then follows form Eq. (25) that z∗0 < 0 if the first-period currency call
options are not too out of the money.
Finally, we add Eqs. (24) and (25) to yield
h∗0 + z
∗
0 = Rx(x
∗
f) +Ry(y
∗
f )− cy(y∗h + y∗f)
+
(ψ1 + ψ2)Cov1[ε˜1,max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]− ψ1Var1[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]− ψ2Var1(ε˜1)
Var1(ε˜1)Var[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]− Cov1[ε˜1,max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]2 .
(A.16)
Using Eqs. (A.13) and (A.15), we can write the numerator on the right-hand side of
Eq. (A.16) as
ψ2Cov1[ε˜1,max(s0 − e0 − ε˜1, 0)]
−ψ1Cov1[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0),max(s0 − e0 − ε˜1, 0)].
Since e0+ ε˜1− s0 = max(e0+ ε˜1− s0, 0)−max(s0− e0− ε˜1, 0), we can write the above
expression as
(ψ2 − ψ1)Cov1[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0),max(s0 − e0 − ε˜1, 0)]
−ψ2Var1[max(s0 − e0 − ε˜1, 0)]
= (ψ1 − ψ2)E1[max(e0 + ε˜1 − s0, 0)]E1[max(s0 − e0 − ε˜1, 0)]
−ψ2Var1[max(s0 − e0 − ε˜1, 0)],
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which is strictly negative if s0 ≤ e0, as is evident from Eq. (A.14). By continuity,
it then follows form Eq. (A.16) that h∗0 + z
∗
0 < Rx(x
∗
f) + Ry(y
∗
f ) − cy(y∗h + y∗f) if the
first-period currency call options are not too out of the money.
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